Bankruptcy and Creditors\u27 Rights by Cox, Roger S.
SMU Law Review
Volume 50
Issue 4 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 5
1997
Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights
Roger S. Cox
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 50 SMU L. Rev. 989 (1997)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol50/iss4/5
BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Roger S. Cox*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 990
II. BANKRUPTCY .......................................... 990
A. SUPREME COURT ...................................... 990
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN FIFTH CIRCUIT AND BELOW ....... 992
1. Collateral Valuation-The Rash that Won't Go
A w ay .............................................. 992
a. The En Banc Majority Opinion ............... 992
b. The Dissent (and Majority Rule in Other
C ircuits) ....................................... 995
c. Conclusion .................................... 999
2. Consumer Case Administration .................... 1000
a. Statement of Intent ........................... 1000
b. Case Administration-Chapter 13 Best
E fforts ........................................ 1001
3. Dischargeability-Willful and Malicious Injury ..... 1002
4. Dischargeability-False Financial Statements ....... 1003
5. Dischargeability-Unscheduled Creditors .......... 1004
6. Dischargeability-State Court Default Judgment ... 1005
7. Dischargeability-Credit Cards .................... 1005
8. H om esteads ....................................... 1007
a. Family Rural Homestead Applied to
W idower ...................................... 1007
b. Temporary Abandonment ..................... 1008
9. Personal Property Exemption-The Insurance Saga
Continues ......................................... 1009
10. Personal Property Exemptions-Tools of the
Trade ............................................. 1011
11. BFP Extended to Post-Petition Tax Sale ............ 1011
III. FEDERAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS .............. 1012
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE COURTS ........... 1014
A. ARTICLE 9-DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL ............ 1014
* Shareholder, Sanders, Baker & Jesko, P.C., Amarillo, Texas; B.S., Southwest Texas
State University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law; Board Certified, Business
Bankruptcy Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization and American Bankruptcy Board of
Certification.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of (i) West Publishing Co. for their
generous contribution of complementary Westlaw database time and (ii) Marsha Morrow
and Janet E. Balke, Legal Assistants, for their able assistance in the preparation of the
manuscript.
SMU LAW REVIEW
B. REAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURES ...................... 1016
C. GUARANTOR NOTICE AND LIABILITY ................. 1017
D. TAX LIEN SUBROGATION .............................. 1018
E. LENDER LIABILITY .................................... 1019
V. CONSUMER CREDIT COLLECTIONS ................. 1020
A. STATE COURT-TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION ACT ....... 1020
B. FEDERAL COURT-FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES A CT ....................................... 1021
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article will focus primarily on significant developments in
Bankruptcy Law and Creditors Rights and Remedies from the
perspective of the Texas practitioner. In somewhat of a departure
from years past, it will feature an analysis of one case dealing with valua-
tion of collateral in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. Otherwise,
the cases included in this Article will be reviewed much more concisely.
In keeping with the Survey's focus on Texas law, this Article is limited to
significant developments impacting upon the creditors' rights or debtor/
creditor practitioner during the Survey period.'
II. BANKRUPTCY
A. SUPREME COURT
Early in the Survey period, the Supreme Court considered the level of
a creditor's reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation necessary to
render a debt non-dischargeable. In Field v. Mans,2 the Court was faced
with a situation involving the "actual fraud" provision of § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which deals with non-dischargeability of certain debts.
Specifically, subsection (a)(2) deals with dischargeability of a debt in-
curred either by: (i) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement regarding financial condition, or (ii) the use
of a materially false written financial statement on which the creditor
"reasonably relies" and which the debtor published with an intent to
1. If a case or statutory amendment does not meet these criteria, chances are that it is
not covered in this Article. The author has attempted to limit the focus of this Article to
issues arising in the enforcement of the debtor/creditor relationship. The reader is urged to
review the Survey Articles on Banking Law and Commercial Transactions, which address
related topics such as usury, failed financial institutions, and Article 9 secured transactions.
For more expansive coverage of bankruptcy developments during the Survey period, see E.
Warren & J. Westbrook, Recent Developments, in UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW
15TH ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE (1996); R. Littlefield & T. Murphy, New Case
Update, in TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 12TH ANNUAL FARM, RANCH AND
AGRI-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (1996). Similar updates are also provided at the
State Bar of Texas Advanced Consumer Bankruptcy Course and Advanced Business
Bankruptcy Course. Additionally, the Texas Tech Law Review's Fifth Circuit Symposium
typically features an annual update of bankruptcy developments in the Fifth Circuit.
2. 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995).
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deceive. 3 The provision dealing with false financial statements explicitly
requires that a creditor "reasonably rely" on the false financial statement
in order for the debt to be declared non-dischargeable. 4 The statute deal-
ing with actual fraud, however, is silent with respect to any level of reli-
ance. 5 The Court, faced with a conflict among the circuits, essentially had
to decide whether and to what extent to impose a reliance requirement
under the "actual fraud" provision of § 523.
The Court applied a concept of statutory construction known as "the
apparent negative pregnant,"'6 which essentially provides that "[a]n ex-
press statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there,
shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance."'7 In
the instant case, the Court essentially had to decide the effect of Congress
excluding a reliance standard in one section of the statute while imposing
a specific reliance standard in another. Justice Souter found the apparent
negative pregnant analysis helpful but found danger in a blind, all-encom-
passing application of such a maxim. 8
The Court noted a significant historical difference between the actual
fraud provision and the false financial provision. The former referred to
a long-standing common law tort, and the latter applied to a more specific
bankruptcy related issue with an entirely different set of problems and
policy considerations.9 The Court reviewed the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which in the context of common law fraud has long suggested the
imposition of a "justifiable" reliance standard. 10 The Court applied the
same meaning to the actual fraud provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 1
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1996).
4. Id
5. To find a debt non-dischargeable under the "actual fraud" provision, the creditor
must prove certain elements that are not unlike common law fraud. Essentially, the credi-
tor must prove the following: that the debtor made a material representation that he knew
at the time to be false; that the debtor made the representation with the intention to
deceive the creditor; that the creditor relied upon the representation; and that the creditor
was damaged as a result. See generally In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996)
(credit card debt found non-dischargeable under "actual fraud" provision).
6. Field, 116 S. Ct. at 442.
7. Id. In other words, "where Congress includes particular language in one section of
a statute, but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Gozlon-
Perez v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404, (1991) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983)).
8. "Without more, the inference might be a helpful one. But there is more here,
showing why the negative pregnant argument should not be elevated to the level of inter-
pretive trump card." Field, 116 S. Ct. at 442. The opinion goes on to point out what would
be in Justice Souter's analysis a nonsensical application of such a standard when there are
obvious reasons not to do so.
9. Id. at 443. Given the history of the actual fraud provision and its relation to com-
mon law fraud, the Court is to infer, unless a statute otherwise dictates, that Congress
means to incorporate established meaning of common law terms.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1979).
11. As the Court stated:
The Restatement expounds upon justifiable reliance by explaining that a
person is justified in relying on a representation of fact "although he might
have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investiga-
tion." Significantly, for our purposes, the illustration is given of a seller of
1997]
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In applying the "justifiable" reliance standard, the Court pointed out
that this is a lower threshold than the more difficult and objective stan-
dard of "reasonable" reliance found in the false statement provision. 12
Reasonable reliance imposes a reasonable person standard. Justifiable
reliance merely requires the creditor to use common sense and not
blindly rely upon a misrepresentation if the falsity is obvious or patent to
the creditor, perhaps suggesting a cursory examination or investigation.
The Court added that in addition to the statutory distinction, a historical
discrepancy in bargaining power between large consumer lenders and un-
sophisticated borrowers provided a policy reason for imposing the rea-
sonable reliance standard in the case of false financial statements. 13
During the Survey period, the Court also issued a number of other
opinions; however, those opinions dealt with issues that were either be-
yond the scope of this Survey 14 or had previously been reviewed in last
year's Survey.' 5
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN FIFTH CIRCUIT AND BELOW1 6
1. Collateral Valuation-The Rash that Won't Go Away
a. The En Banc Majority Opinion
In a case that by now should be familiar to regular readers of this Sur-
vey, the Fifth Circuit reversed itself and split with at least five other cir-
land who says it is free of encumbrances; according to the Restatement, a
buyer's reliance on this factual representation is justifiable, even if he could
have "walk[ed] across the street to the office of the register of deeds in the
courthouse" and easily have learned of an unsatisfied mortgage.
Field, 116 S. Ct. at 444 (citation omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 540(1979)). Similarly, the Court further notes that, Illustration 1 of PROSSER's LAW OF TORTS
also suggested a justifiable reliance standard quoting "[iut is only where, under the circum-
stances, the facts should be apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence from a cur-
sory glance, or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is
being deceived, that he is required to make an investigation of his own." Id. (citing WiL-
LIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 108, 718 (4th ed. 1971)).
12. Field, 116 S. Ct. at 439.
13. Id. at 447. It is worth noting that reasonableness is not rendered totally irrelevant:
[A]s for the reasonableness of reliance, our reading of the Act does not leave
reasonableness irrelevant, for the greater the distance between the reliance
claimed and the limits of the reasonable, the greater the doubt about reliance
in fact. Naifs may recover, at common law and in bankruptcy, but lots of
creditors are not at all naive. The subjectiveness of justiciability cuts both
ways, and reasonableness goes to the probability of actual reliance.
Id. at 446.
14. See United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (priority of post-petition tax
penalties); United States v. Reorganized C.F & 1. Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2106(1996) (treatment of federal tax penalties); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 116 S. Ct.
494 (1995) (appellate review of removal/remand proceedings); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (sovereign immunity).
15. See Citizen's Bank of Maryland v. Strump, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995) (Bank's adminis-
trative freeze and set-off). This case was reviewed in last year's survey issue. See Roger S.
Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 731,
732-34 (1996) [hereinafter Cox, 1996 Annual Survey].
16. The Fifth Circuit has decided a number of cases dealing with bankruptcy and
creditors' right since the Survey. For a preview of cases that may be reviewed in next
[Vol. 50
1997] BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 993
cuits' 7 in In re Rash.18 The Fifth Circuit has now decided, en banc, that in
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, courts should begin any analysis of collat-
eral valuation (even when the debtor proposes to keep the collateral)
with the wholesale value of the collateral. This is a departure from the
prior Rash opinion and numerous other circuits, where a majority rule
had developed that in reorganization proceedings, collateral should be
valued at what amounts to replacement cost, or at least without deducting
hypothetical foreclosure costs. Given the risk of oversimplification, split
among the circuits, vigorous dissent, and the far reaching economic con-
sequences of this decision, some analysis of this decision is in order.19
In Rash, the debtor purchased a Kenworth truck tractor, the financing
of which was ultimately provided by Associates Commercial Corporation
(ACC). The debtor filed for Chapter 13 relief, and the debtor's plan pro-
vided for a "cram down" of ACC's secured claim under § 1325(a)(5)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 20 ACC filed a proof of claim and a motion for
relief from the automatic stay. The court heard ACC's motion, the
debtor's objection to ACC's claim, and other matters, the disposition of
which required the court to determine the value of the truck for purposes
of ACC's secured claim.2'
The bankruptcy court denied ACC's motion for relief from stay and
entered an order fixing the amount of ACC's secured claim at the truck's
wholesale price. The court apparently reasoned that it had to value the
truck from the "creditor's perspective" because § 506(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code sets the amount of a secured claim at "the value of [the]
year's Survey, see, for example, Swate v. Hartwell, (In re Swate) 99 F.3d 1282 (5th Cir.
1996) (dischargeability of support obligations under divorce settlement agreement) (res
judicata arising out of prior proceedings); Carmichael v. Osherow, (In re Carmichael) 100
F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996) (exempt status of IRA); O'Connell v. Troy & Nichols, Inc., In re
Cabrera, 99 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1996) (treatment of first lien residential mortgage debt in
Chapter 13 plan).
17. See infra text accompanying note 37.
18. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1994),
modified on denial of rehearing, 62 F.3d 685 (1995); modified on rehearing en banc, 90 F.3d
1036 (1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 758 (1997). Unless otherwise stated, further citations
to Rash will be to the en banc opinion at 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996). The prior opinions
in Rash have been discussed in previous Surveys. See Cox, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note
15, at 741 ("The Rash saga is not over, however, because the Fifth Circuit has granted
Rehearing En Banc."); Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors Rights, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV., 875, 885 (1995) [hereinafter Cox, 1995 Annual Survey] (sub-
stantive discussion of Fifth Circuit's initial panel opinion.)
19. It is this author's desire and that of the editors of this Survey to provide reporting
on significant cases as concisely as possible. This is a departure from that policy. For a
more concise review of the specific holding in Rash, see D. Pawlowic, 20 TEX. BANK LAW.
17 (1996). See also Valuation of Collateral Revisited, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (1996); The
Valuation Debate, 15 AM. BANKR INST. J. 1 (1996).
20. For convenience, references to "the Code" shall mean the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code as codified at Title 11, United States Code.
21. See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1039-40. The majority compares the expert testimony of each
party's valuation expert; however, the credibility or experience of the experts did not ap-
pear to be an issue in the trial court. See In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 430-31 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1993).
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creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the property. ' 22 In short, the
bankruptcy court determined that the value of the truck "was equal to the
amount that ACC could realize if it exercised its right under the Security
Agreement to repossess and sell the truck."'23
On rehearing en banc,24 the majority affirmed the bankruptcy court.25
The majority's analysis focused on its perception of Texas law regarding
secured transactions and on its reading of § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which prescribes the method for determining valuation of secured
claims. Section 506 provides that an allowed claim is secured "to the ex-
tent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property .... Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of
the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property. '26
The majority initially examined the first sentence of § 506 in an effort
to determine the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the property.
The majority reasoned that under state law the creditor's interest is in the
nature of a security interest, "giving the creditor the right to repossess
and sell the collateral and nothing more. ' 27 The court also hypothesized
that either of the two "cram down" alternatives found in § 1325 (specifi-
cally: (i) surrender of collateral, or (ii) retaining and paying the present
value of the collateral over time) should effectively yield the same result
for the secured creditor.28 The majority sought symmetry between the
two "cram down" alternatives, expressing a concern that valuing a credi-
tor's secured claim at replacement cost (in the retention and use context)
would provide more protection than the secured creditor would realize
under the collateral surrender scenario. 29 For some reason, the court
found this unacceptable. 30
The court then focused on the second sentence of § 506, which man-
dates that a court value collateral in light of the purposed disposition or
use of that property. 31 The court concluded that such mandatory lan-
guage did not offer the "clear textual guidance" needed to justify depar-
ture from what the majority thought was established state law regarding
realization upon security interests. 32 Specifically, the majority viewed
state law under the UCC as limiting a secured creditor's interest in collat-
eral to what amounts to its remedies upon default.33 As the dissent
points out, however, there really is no state law regarding treatment of
22. Rash, 90 F.3d at 1040, (quoting In re Rash, 149 B.R. at 433).
23. In re Rash, 149 B.R. at 433.
24. Initially, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the wholesale approach and found that
the inquiry should begin at the replacement cost, which is in effect a retail valuation. See
In re Rash, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 1995).
25. Rash, 90 F.3d at 1061.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
27. Rash, 90 F.3d at 1044.
28. Id. at 1046.
29. Id. at 1047.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1047-51.
32. Id. at 1050.
33. Id. at 1041-42.
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secured claims in a reorganization context.34
In conclusion, based upon the majority's reading of the statutory lan-
guage, economic considerations, and legislative history, the valuation of a
secured creditor's interest (at least according to the majority opinion)
"should start with what the creditor could realize if it repossessed and
sold the collateral pursuant to its security agreement, taking into account
the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the
collateral." 35 Importantly, however, bankruptcy courts are allowed to
make adjustments depending upon considerations arising from the facts
of each particular case. 36
b. The Dissent (and Majority Rule in Other Circuits)
The en banc majority not only has the Fifth Circuit effectively reversing
itself, but it now has placed itself clearly within the minority view. As of
this writing, Rash is inconsistent with holdings in at least five other cir-
cuits. 37 There is perhaps no better critical analysis of the majority opin-
ion than is found in Judge Smith's dissent.38 Although the dissent speaks
for itself, the majority opinion warrants some analysis here, especially
34. Id. at 1069. (Smith, J., dissenting). This is further discussed infra note 39.
35. Id, at 1061. Rash has been followed by at least one district court. See In re Mad-
dox, 200 B.R. 546 (N.J. 1996) (apparently decided before most recent opinion in Taffi (see
infra note 37)).
36. Id. at 1061. In the bankruptcy court opinion, however, Judge Sharp found "no
justification" from varying from wholesale valuation of Mr. Rash's truck. In re Rash, 149
B.R. at 433.
37. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 313-16 (7th Cir. 1996) (average between wholesale
and retail most suitable "middle ground"); Taffi v. United States, 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that in Chapter 11 context, confirmation value of secured claim is measured
by fair market value with no deduction for hypothetical foreclosure and repossession
costs); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that in
Chapter 13 case, confirmation value of secured claim is measured by retail value without
hypothetical sale cost deduction); Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries v. New Bedford Institu-
tion for Savings (In re Winthrop Ole Farm Nurseries), 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding
that in Chapter 11 confirmation value is measured by "fair market value" rather than liqui-
dation value); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Pees (In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401 (6th Cir.
1994) (no deduction for hypothetical sale cost when debtor purposes to retain collateral in
Chapter 13); Coker v. Sovran Equity Mortgage Corp. (In re Coker), 973 F.2d 258 (4th Cir.
1992) (value of collateral measured without deduction for hypothetical sale cost when
debtor retains collateral in Chapter 13). Compare Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980
F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds 508 U.S. 958, (1993) with General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 954 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 908, (1992). Mitchell, however, has been overruled. See Taffi, 96 F.3d at
1193.
38. For starters, the dissent notes:
The majority dismantles 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) by combining a question-
begging interpretation of the statute's first sentence with an unreasonably
restrictive reading of the second. Having thereby obscured the section's
plain meaning, the majority turns to an inapposite presumption, an incorrect
economic analysis, and the last resort of judicial redrafting-selective read-
ing of the legislative history. Not surprisingly, this policy-driven reconstruc-
tion of the statute has been squarely rejected by every other circuit that has
considered it.
Rash, 90 F.3d at 1061 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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given what may have been a misapplication of existing state law regarding
security interests.
As mentioned above, § 506(a) contains two sentences. In effect, the
first sentence relies upon existing state law. The bankruptcy court must
first determine the nature and extent of the creditor's interest in the es-
tate's interest in an item of property. Arguably, this is the secured credi-
tor's "security interest." Once this determination is made, then the court
looks to the second sentence of § 506(a), which mandates that the court
make the valuation in light of the purpose for which the collateral will be
disposed of or used. What follows is a brief analysis of how this author
believes the Fifth Circuit first misunderstood substantive state law regard-
ing security interests and second, how the court then applied that sub-
stantive law in an illogical fashion. Additionally, the court's analysis
further goes askew when it essentially defers to a body of state law that
simply does not exist.
First, an analysis of the state law regarding secured transactions reflects
that the court's reading of the first sentence of § 506(c) may be flawed. In
the context of personal property, the applicable state law is article 9 of
the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Article 9 deals with the crea-
tion, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in personal prop-
erty.39 Article 9, however, is silent with respect to any limitation on the
extent of the creditor's security interest, other than to the extent the cred-
itor has given value. In other words, under state law, the lien simply ex-
ists to the extent of the indebtedness, which remains an encumbrance
against the property.
More specifically, section 9.504 provides the secured party's remedies
upon default.40 Those remedies consist of disposing of the collateral in a
"commercially reasonable" manner, applying the net proceeds to satisfac-
tion of the debt,41 or retaining the collateral in total satisfaction of the
debt.42 The rules regarding disposition of collateral, however, do not dic-
tate that a creditor dispose of collateral in a wholesale fashion, nor do
they purport to limit a creditor's interest in collateral to such a hypotheti-
cal result. 43 Rather, in the spirit of attempting to obtain the highest value
possible (which benefits both the debtor and the secured creditor), there
is nothing to preclude the creditor from attempting to dispose of the col-
lateral on a more "retail" basis. If and to the extent the creditor is suc-
cessful in obtaining such a higher value, that value goes to the creditor (to
39. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101-9.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). Actu-
ally, the term "security interest" is defined in article 1. See id. at § 1.201(37)(A) ("'Security
interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation ... .
40. Id. § 9.504.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 9.505.
43. As reviewed elsewhere in this Article, at least one Texas court has noted that
§ 9.504 "does not require but rather allows a secured party to sell the collateral." Schmid v.
Texas Commerce Bank, 912 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ de-
nied) (emphasis added).
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the extent of the debt) because it constitutes part of the secured creditor's
security interest."4 Alternatively, the creditor may retain the collateral in
a "strict foreclosure" of its security interest.
45
Article 9, however, is absolutely devoid of even any mention of restruc-
turing or reorganizing such secured debt, in a bankruptcy context or
otherwise. This is because there simply is no state law regarding the
rights of secured creditors in reorganizations. This field has been pre-
empted by the Code, which is federal law. Additionally, in the context of
day to day commercial expectations, there is likewise no such limitation
in the absence of an intervening bankruptcy. These principles are equally
applicable to transactions involving real and personal property.
46
Turning to the Code, the second sentence of § 506(a) unequivocally
mandates that valuation "shall be determined in light of the purpose of
the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property. 47
When the purpose is a "cram down" of property to be retained and uti-
lized by a reorganizing debtor, the only logical conclusion is that the court
"shall" look to the value of the property "in the hands of the debtor, not
on the auction block."' 48 It is logically and factually incongruous to ana-
lyze an actual situation involving retention and use of an item of property
by valuing it based upon the purely hypothetical cost of a foreclosure sale
that (if a plan is successful) would never happen. As the Eighth Circuit
has clearly stated (and as quoted in the Rash dissent):
[W]here a debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, the pur-
pose of the valuation is to determine the amount an undersecured
creditor will be paid for the debtor's continued possession and use of
the collateral, not to determine the amount such creditor would re-
ceive if it hypothetically had to repossess and sell the collateral.
Such an interpretation ignores the expressed dictates of § 506(a). 49
More recently, in In re Taffi, the Ninth Circuit, in concluding that fair
market value is the appropriate measure, put the entire issue in
perspective:
When a Chapter 11 debtor or a Chapter 13 debtor intends to retain
property subject to a lien, the purpose of a valuation under § 506(a)
is not to determine the amount the creditor would receive if it hypo-
thetically had to foreclose and sell the collateral. Neither the fore-
closure value nor the costs of repossession are to be considered
44. Obviously, if the collateral was disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner,
and the proceeds insufficient to satisfy the debt, then the creditor may have a claim for a
deficiency. See Tanenbaum v. Economics Labs., 628 S.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Tex. 1982).
45. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.505(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
46. Imagine the nonsensical result if security interests and liens were so limited. For
example, when real or personal property that secures a debt is sold in the ordinary course
of business, the "payoff" is always the full amount of the debt or lien, and in the absence of
an agreement between the parties, the secured creditor is not limited to the net proceeds of
a hypothetical forced sale. This is not contemplated in the typical transaction, and there is
no state law that would mandate such approach.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
48. See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1061 (Smith, J., dissenting).
49. In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
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because no foreclosure is intended. Instead, when the proposed use
of the property is continued retention by the debtor, the purpose of
the valuation is to determine how much the creditor will receive for
the debtor's continued possession. Hypothetical sale costs are not to
be considered because no sale is intended ....
... [V]aluation must be accomplished within the actual situation
presented. Consequently, the value has to be the fair market value
of what the debtors are using.50
In what amounts to a disregard of the second sentence of § 506(a)
(which results in an overly narrow reading of the first sentence), the ma-
jority refers to a canon of construction that disfavors displacement of well
established areas of state law. As mentioned above and in the dissent,
however, that maxim does not apply to Rash because there simply is no
state law that addresses reorganization of debts.
The majority's search for symmetry between the "cram down" alterna-
tives of retention and surrender of the collateral to the secured creditor
seems similarly incongruent. The majority seems concerned that valua-
tion at a replacement or similar cost would give a creditor more protec-
tion and even more potential return than it would have under the
surrender/foreclosure scenario. This concern is misplaced, however, be-
cause the two situations are in no way symmetrical. On the contrary, they
arise out of two very different scenarios. First, surrender of collateral to a
secured creditor truly is like the situation contemplated by section 9.504
of the UCC because the creditor in fact will be disposing of the collateral.
The cost of repossession and disposition are not merely hypothetical, but
they will in all likelihood be incurred. Thus, it makes sense to take a
wholesale approach in a "surrender" situation.
On the other hand, retention and use of the collateral create an entirely
different situation. Not only are there no repossession and sale costs to
be taken into account, but the collateral truly is worth more to the debtor
and the estate and, therefore, to the secured creditor. To the extent the
debtor retains and uses collateral for a greater purpose (reorganization),
the creditor's interest in the collateral is simply worth more. This is con-
sistent with the majority's own statement and recognition of the funda-
mental concept that valuation for one purpose does not necessarily
control for another, especially in light of the admonition of the second
sentence of § 506(a).
Finally, although in a somewhat different context, the Supreme Court
has stated on more than one occasion that the "creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property" means "the value of the collateral. '51
50. Taffi, 96 F.3d at 1192. As another circuit explained, by retaining the collateral, the
reorganizing debtor is insuring that the very event that gives rise to the majority's starting
point for valuation will not take place. See In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d at
74.
51. See Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 328-29, (1993) (Under
§ 506(a), a claim is secured "to the extent of the value of [the] property"); United Savings
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The Fifth Circuit even alluded to this concept in an earlier case.52 Of
course, the secured creditor's interest is limited to the estate's interest in
the property. Not only is this common sense, but it is consistent with the
fundamental concept of state law-the secured creditor's interest in an
item of property can be no greater than the interest conveyed by the
debtor. In effect, the debtor's interest that was pledged to the creditor is
the interest that is being valued. This does not mean, however, that the
creditor's interest is limited to the proceeds of a hypothetical, imaginary
forced sale that may never occur.
c. Conclusion
It is not the place of this Survey issue to determine whether a decision
is "right" or "wrong." It is important to note, however, that with the
Rash decision, the en banc majority now puts the Fifth Circuit in the mi-
nority view. Although there may be no set answer to the issue of collat-
eral valuation in the absence of new legislation, the Rash majority seems
to have misapplied state law, which leads to logical inconsistencies in the
majority opinion. These inconsistencies cannot be explained, especially
coming from a circuit that has in the past been so consistent with its
"plain meaning" approach to statutory construction.
A tempting "practical" approach is taken by the Ninth Circuit in Taffi,
in which that court concluded that "the value has to be the fair market
value of what the debtors are using."'53 Although Taffi dealt with real
property, the court made the following observation with respect to motor
vehicles: "We make no judgment whether the fair market value of an
automobile is high blue book or low blue book or some other value; that
value is to be determined by the facts presented to the bankruptcy
court." 5
4
Obviously, Taffi does not provide what may be a much needed hard
and fast guideline for valuing motor vehicles, but neither does the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 55 Given the choice between the two extremes, however,
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 484
U.S. 365, 372, (1988) (The value of a creditor's interest in context of § 506(a) means "the
value of the collateral").
52. See Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev.
Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1989) ("In situations involving only one creditor and
one debtor, the value of the ...secured claim is simply the value of the underlying
collateral.").
53. In re Taffi, 96 F.3d at 1192.
54. Id. at 1193.
55. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 165 B.R. 524, 529-30 (S.D. Ga. 1994) where the Court
stated:
[T]he legislative history of Section 506(a) makes clear that "value" does not
necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor
does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to deter-
mine value on a case by case basis, taking into account the facts of each case
and the competing interest in the case .... A fixed "wholesale" or "retail"
standard for Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) valuations is inconsistent with Section
506(a)'s aversion to standardized procedure .... [T]he Bankruptcy Code
nowhere implies that NADA "wholesale" and "retail" values should operate
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state law, statutory construction, and logic all dictate that retained collat-
eral used in a debtor's reorganization should be valued based upon its
actual value, which is in effect its actual replacement cost.
Certiorari has been granted for Rash.56 The well-prepared practitioner
should know, however, that the wholesale value approach suggested by
Rash is only the starting point. Those who provide courts with well-rea-
soned, qualified expert testimony and fact evidence will be well served.
2. Consumer Case Administration
a. Statement of Intent
The Fifth Circuit decided another case that should have a direct impact
on the administration of consumer bankruptcies. In In re Johnson,57 the
court addressed what had been some uncertainty regarding the effect of
the Statement of Intent required by § 521. Under § 521, an individual
Chapter 7 debtor is required to file, within thirty days after the petition
date, a statement of intent regarding consumer debts secured by property
of the estate.58 Specifically, the debtor is required to state whether he
intends to retain or surrender such property, and if such property is ex-
empt, to specify the exemption and to state whether the debtor intends to
redeem the property or reaffirm the debt secured by that property.5 9 The
debtor is required to exercise that stated intention within forty-five days
after the filing of the notice of intent.60 Whether the debtor is in fact
limited to these three options (reaffirmation, redemption, or surrender)
"has been hotly contested in recent jurisprudence. ' 6 1
The Fifth Circuit found that the specific language of § 521 mandates
the filing of such a statement. 62 Moreover, the court agreed with an ear-
lier Eleventh Circuit case that decided that Chapter 7 debtors are limited
to the three options set forth in the statute, and that compliance is
as any sort of a standard for measuring compliance with Section
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) .... Fair market value is "[tihe amount at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither be-
ing under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of the relevant facts." . . . Ascertaining "fair market value" is an
objective broad enough to permit use of NADA Guide Books and similar
authoritative sources as evidence of value, but without implying that the val-
uation determination is limited to those sources.
Id. (citations omitted). For cases applying both wholesale and retail values, see for exam-
ple, In re Madison, 186 B.R. 182 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Myers, 178 B.R. 518 (Bankr.
W.D. Ok. 1995); In re Carlan, 157 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993). For a thorough discus-
sion of collateral valuation in Chapter 13, see, Keith M. Lundin, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY
SECrION 5.46-5.48 (Wylie 1991 & Supp. 1996) (Author discusses most of above cases and
comes to conclusions similar to that found in Rash).
56. 117 S. Ct. 758 (1997).
57. Johnson v. Sun Finance Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1996).
59. Id.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1996).
61. In re Johnson, 89 F.3d at 251.
62. Id. at 252.
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mandatory. 63 Therefore, it would appear that simply ignoring § 521 is no
longer an option in the Fifth Circuit.64
b. Case Administration-Chapter 13 Best Efforts
In In re Jobe,65 Judge Monroe denied confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan proposed by a debtor who apparently was intentionally underem-
ployed and who did not devote "his best efforts" to funding the Chapter
13 plan. 66 Under § 1325(b), a Chapter 13 plan may not be confirmed on
objection, unless the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected dis-
posable income to be received during the three year period of the plan is
applied to make payments under the plan.67 A crucial point in Jobe is
that the Chapter 13 income test is more than just multiplying the debtor's
current income by the number of months in the plan. 68 Rather, Chapter
13 requires that all of the debtor's projected disposable income be dedi-
cated to funding the plan.69 According to Jobe, "the capacity of the
debtor to earn more money and, thereby, pay more in plan payments has
been a factor that the Fifth Circuit and other courts have considered. '70
In Jobe, the debtor was a relatively young able-bodied man with no
apparent medical problems and with marketable skills gained while in the
Army. The debtor apparently owned a small family farm; however, no
crops were grown on that farm, and the debtor had no other work. The
court found that "sitting idly by on a farm, the down payment for which
was advanced by one's second largest unsecured creditor, and collecting
'early' retirement pay from the Army while offering unsecured creditors
four cents on the dollar hardly strikes the court as one's 'best efforts."' 71
63. Id.
64. Id. The court denied the creditor's motion to dismiss; however, the creditor's mo-
tion to compel in compliance with § 521 was granted. The debtors were allowed ten (10)
days within which to notify the creditor of their intention, and, in the event of the debtor's
failure to do so, then the Bankruptcy Court was authorized to dismiss the case or deny the
debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6). Id. As mentioned above, the Court relied
on the Eleventh Circuit in holding in Taylor v. AGE Federal Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3
F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993).
65. In re Jobe, 197 B.R. 823 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
66. Id. at 827.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
68. 197 B.R. at 826-27.
69. Id. at 826.
70. Id. at 827; see also Commercial Credit Corp. v. Killough (In re Killough), 900 F.2d
61, 66 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[Tjhere may be instances where income obtained through working
overtime can and should appropriately be included in a debtor's projected and disposable
income for the purposes of a Chapter 13 plan."); In re Dunning, 157 B.R. 51, 53 (Bankr.
W.D. N.Y. 1993).
71. In re Jobe, 197 B.R. at 827. For a discussion of non-exclusive factors applied in a
case decided prior to the 1984 Amendments, see In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir.
1982). In Jobe, the Court seemed to indicate that the Estus factor and the "best efforts" or
"ability to pay" test under Section 1325(b) to be equally applicable. Id. at 826.
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3. Dischargeability72-Willful and Malicious Injury
In what may become known as "The Shotgun Case," 73 the Fifth Circuit
apparently narrowed somewhat the scope of willful and malicious injury
necessary to render a debt non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). In In re
Delaney,74 Delaney (the debtor), apparently in anticipation of a confron-
tation with Corley, loaded his double-barreled shotgun and took it with
him to face Corley, who remained seated in the car that had stopped in
Delaney's driveway. Delaney aimed the loaded shotgun at Corley
through the car's windshield, and, with his finger on the trigger, tapped
the shotgun twice on the windshield. The gun discharged, apparently by
accident.
The court found that Corley's damages were dischargeable, reasoning
that for willfulness and malice to prevent discharge under § 523(a)(6),
"the debtor must have intended the actual injury that resulted. '75 Quot-
ing a Georgia bankruptcy court, the Fifth Circuit noted that § 523(a)(6)
"excepts from discharge debts arising from 'willful and malicious injury'
rather than 'willful and malicious acts which cause an injury.' 76 In other
words, had Delaney meant to pull the trigger, then the damages would
have been non-dischargeable; however, under the Fifth Circuit's logic, no
matter how foreseeable the consequences of Delaney's inexcusable acts,
those consequences apparently do not give rise to non-dischargeability. 77
Similarly, in In re Greenway,78 the debtor apparently crashed a motor
boat into another vessel, causing a fatality and various injuries. The
debtor had apparently been drinking. The creditor sued in state court,
and a jury, finding the debtor sixty percent responsible, awarded dam-
ages. The state court jury, however, did not find that the debtor was
grossly negligent.79 Subsection (a)(9) excepts from discharge, death or
personal injuries caused by the operation of a "motor vehicle" if that op-
72. For an expansive update on dischargeability litigation, see Keith Lundin, Recent
Developments in Discharge and Dischargeability Litigation, in TWELFTH ANNUAL TEXAS
TECH FARM, RANCH, AND AGRI-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (1996).
73. Judge Keith Lundin coined this phrase at the 1996 Texas Tech Farm, Ranch, and
Agri-business Bankruptcy Institute.
74. Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney), 97 F. 3d 800 (5th Cir. 1996).
75. Id. at 802.
76. Id. (quoting In re Hampel, 110 B.R. 88, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990)).
77. One could easily conclude that this inequitable result points out the need for a
legislative amendment to what in hindsight appears to be a poorly drafted statute. Numer-
ous courts have found claims nondischargeable when an intentional act has resulted in a
foreseeable injury. See, e.g., Perkins v. Scharfe, 817 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Cecchini,
780 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1983). This has even
arisen in a medical malpractice context. See Kelt v. Quezaada (In re Cole), 136 B.R. 453,
459 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (doctor's willful disregard of his duties and acceptable medical
practices rendered malpractice claim nondischargeable); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Frank-
lin (In re Franklin), 726 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984); Kawaauhau v. Geiger (In re Geiger), 172
B.R. 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
78. Boyce v. Greenway, (In re Greenway), 71 F.3d 1177 (5th Cir. 1996).
79. The Fifth Circuit faced two issues. First, the Fifth Circuit had to determine
whether a motor boat was a "motor vehicle" as that term is used under section 523(a)(9).
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eration was unlawful due to the debtor's intoxication.80 The court found
that under its "plain meaning" statutory analysis, the term "motor vehi-
cle" did not include a motor boat.81 Therefore, the court found subsec-
tion (a)(9) inapplicable to the operation of a motor boat.82
The court also addressed a collateral estoppel issue arising out of the
state court litigation regarding the accident. As mentioned above, the
state court jury did not find that the debtor was grossly negligent. The
court inferred that if the debtor was found not to be grossly negligent in
an actually litigated state court proceeding between the same parties,
then it necessarily followed that it had been preclusively decided that the
debtor's actions did not come up to the "intentional" and lacking "just
cause for excuse" standard required for a non-dischargeability finding
under the "willful and malicious" provisions of subsection (a)(6). 83
4. Dischargeability-False Financial Statements
The Fifth Circuit revisited the issue of non-dischargeability of debts in-
curred as a result of a false financial statement in In re Norris.84 The false
financial statement in Norris was made as part of an annual renewal pro-
cess of what apparently was a series of year to year notes. Specifically,
the debtors represented that they had a cash flow surplus of $45,000 at a
time when their excess cash flow was almost non-existent.8 5 The debtor
contended, however, that the debt was dischargeable because no "new"
funds were disbursed in response to the false financial statement, 86 and
that they lacked the requisite intent to deceive the bank. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, noted that § 523(a)(2) expressly lists "renewal . . . of
credit"8 7 as one of the classes of obligations excepted from discharge.88
The court also determined that regardless of the actual intent, the bank-
ruptcy court found that at a minimum "there was a reckless disregard for
the truth."89 The Fifth Circuit found no error in this reasoning.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1996).
81. 71 F.3d at 1180.
82. Id.
83. Greenway, 71 F.3d at 1180-81. This case was decided before the Delaney shotgun
case. Under the Delaney rationale, it is even less likely that the debtor's operation of the
motorboat would have resulted in a non-dischargeable claim.
84. Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id. Section 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt is nondis-
charable "for money... or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit" obtained by a
written statement: "(i) that is materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor's ... financial
condition; (iii)on which the creditor ... reasonably relied; and (iv) that the debtor caused
to be made or published with intent to deceive." Each of these four elements must be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
87. 70 F.3d at 29 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)). The Fifth Circuit noted that although
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to provide debtors a fresh start, the Supreme Court
has concluded that with respect to the non-dischargeability provisions "Congress evidently
concluded that the creditors' interest in recovering full payments of debts in these catego-
ries outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start." Id. at 30 (quoting Grogan,
498 U.S. at 287).
88. Id. at 29.
89. Id. at 30 n.12.
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5. Dischargeability- Unscheduled Creditors
In In re Faden,90 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding of non-dis-
chargeability of a claim of an unlisted, unsecured creditor, even in a no-
asset case. The debtor apparently had full knowledge of the creditor's
correct address; however, he failed to provide that information to coun-
sel, whose secretary was left to resort to the telephone book. The secre-
tary found an address for its parent company, and that is the address to
which the notice was mailed. Apparently, the creditor never received the
notice and filed an adversary proceeding after the debtor's discharge
seeking a finding that the debts owed were non-dischargeable.
The court noted that the burden is on the debtor to complete schedules
accurately and that the burden of proof rests upon the debtor to show
that a creditor had notice or actual knowledge in order to avoid applica-
bility of § 523(a)(3)(A). 91 The court identified what it had previously re-
ferred to as the three Robinson factors in evaluating whether an unlisted
creditor's debt would be discharged: (1) the reasons the debtor failed to
list the creditor; (2) the amount of disruption that would likely occur; and
(3) the prejudice suffered by the listed creditors and the unlisted creditor
in question. 92
In Faden there was arguably little or no prejudice to the unlisted credi-
tor because Faden was a no asset case. No bar date had ever been set, so
there was no deadline by which creditors had to file proofs of claim, and
there were no assets for distribution to creditors. What is critical to note,
however, is that the Fifth Circuit gave great deference to the bankruptcy
court's apparent conclusion that the debtor was not credible and gave
virtually no excuse for why the creditor's address was not provided to
counsel.93 The court then alluded to other authority to the effect that
notwithstanding factors like those found in Robinson (in particular preju-
dice to the creditor), the unscheduled debt should remain non-discharge-
able if the debtor's failure to schedule the debt is due to any intentional
design, fraud, or improper motive (in other words, more than "mere neg-
ligence or inadvertence"). 94 Accordingly, the court found that the bank-
ruptcy court did not abuse its discretion and held the debt non-
dischargeable despite the fact that the creditor would have received no
disbursement had a claim been filed.95
90. Faden v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. (In re Faden), 96 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1996).
91. § 523(a)(3)(A) provides that an unlisted creditor's claim is not discharged "unless
such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for ... timely filing" of a
proof of claim. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (1996).
92. 96 F.3d at 796 (quoting Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1964)).
93. Id. at 796.
94. Id. at 797 (citing In re Stone, 10 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also In re Smith,
21 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994)(unscheduled creditor's claim held non-dischargeable when
debtor's scheduled creditor two and a half years after filing the case, but listed the wrong
address, which could have been easily corrected by attempts to contact creditor).
95. 96 F.3d at 797. "The decision to reopen a bankruptcy case and allow amendment of
schedules is committed to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge and will not be set
aside absent abuse of discretion." Id. at 796.
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6. Dischargeability-State Court Default Judgment
A federal district court revisited the issue of the preclusive effect of a
state court default judgment in the context of dischargeability issues. In
In re Pancake,96 the federal district court reversed a bankruptcy court
summary judgment that held a state court default judgment preclusive on
the issue of dischargeability of a debt arising out of fraud in a fiduciary
capacity.
In the state court, the debtor's pleadings were stricken for discovery
abuse, and a summary judgment was entered. The district court noted
that there was no summary judgment evidence regarding whether and to
what extent the state court took evidence, conducted a "prove up" hear-
ing, or otherwise took testimony from witnesses in support of the judg-
ment.97 Rather, the only summary judgment evidence before the
bankruptcy court was a reference in the judgment that it was entered "af-
ter hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel. '98
The district court distinguished its finding from In re Garner,99 a Fifth
Circuit case reviewed in last year's Survey, in which the Fifth Circuit ap-
plied collateral estoppel issue preclusion based upon a state court default
judgment.'00 The district court noted that in Garner, however, the sum-
mary judgment evidence presented to the bankruptcy court clearly indi-
cated that an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the state court.' 0 '
The court recognized that preclusive effect of state court default judg-
ments must be determined under state law;102 however, that same court
cited federal case law to the effect that a default judgment does not meet
the "actually litigated" test for application of collateral estoppel. 103 The
court stressed the "actually litigated" requirement for collateral estoppel
effect, even in the face of Texas authority that a pre-answer default judg-
ment is not subject to collateral attack under state law.'0 4
7. Dischargeability-Credit Cards
The issue of non-dischargeability of credit card debt based on fraud has
96. 199 B.R. 350 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id.
99. In re Garner, 56 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1995).
100. The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion reflected in an opinion published
after the survey period. See In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195 (5th Cir. 1996) (state court defaultjudgment following stricken pleadings given collateral estoppel effect).
101. Pancake, 199 B.R. at 359.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing In re Turner, 144 B.R. 47, 51-53 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992)).
104. See, e.g., Allen-West Comm'n Co. v. Gibson, 288 S.W. 342,244 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1921, writ ref'd)(pre-answered default judgment establishes allegations in petition and can-
not be collaterally attached).
The analysis in Pancake appears to differ slightly from that found in Garner; however, if
Pancake is correct, then the cautious practitioner seeking a dischargeability finding based
on collateral estoppel should at a minimum include some reference in summary judgment
evidence to whatever evidentiary proceedings were conducted in the state court.
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been the subject of substantial litigation in recent years. 105 In addition to
the cash advance and luxury goods provisions found in the Bankruptcy
Code, 106 many of the cases seem to deal with whether the debtor's use of
the credit card constitutes an express or implied representation as to that
person's ability to repay the debt.10 7
In a recent case, Judge Akard of the Northern District weighed in on
the issue. In In re McDaniel,08 the court was faced with a classic case of
an unsolicited promotional campaign in which the credit card issuer uni-
laterally raised the debtor's credit limit and sent the debtor "Access
Checks" to take advantage of a new low interest rate. According to the
bankruptcy court, the debtor was having some financial difficulty at the
time she took a cash advance to pay other debts; however, she testified
that she did not make a final decision to file bankruptcy until approxi-
mately two and a half months later. In the ensuing adversary proceeding,
the bankruptcy court held the bank to the new standard of "justifiable
reliance" on any false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud on
the part of the debtor. 10 9 The opinion states that the creditor offered no
evidence of reliance but apparently relied upon the inference that "where
hopeless insolvency at the time of the purchases make payment impossi-
ble, fraudulent intent may be inferred.""10
The court, recognizing that fraud is rarely proven by direct evidence,
looked to a totality of the circumstances test supplied by another bank-
ruptcy court."' Specifically, the court listed the following factors: (i) the
length of time between the loan and the bankruptcy; (ii) changes in the
buying habits of the debtors; (iii) the debtor's financial sophistication; (iv)
the debtor's employment status; (v) whether the debtor consulted an at-
torney regarding bankruptcy before incurring the charges; (vi) whether
the purchases were for luxuries (as opposed to necessities); and (vii)
whether the debtor was hopelessly insolvent."12
105. See, e.g., In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) (credit card debt found non-
dischargeable based upon debtor's express or implied representations of intention to repay
debt); In re Ladouceur, 95-CV-271, 1996 WL 596718 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1996) (upheld
summary judgment based upon debtor's admissions of the elements of fraud in credit card
transaction); see also In re Haji, 201 B.R. 176 (E.D. Mich. 1996); In re Willis, 200 B.R. 868
(W.D. Mo. 1996); In re Bordgee, 198 B.R. 773 (9th Cir. App. 1996) (panel decision).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (certain charges for luxury goods or cash advances within
sixty days prior to bankruptcy presumed non-dischargeable).
107. See, e.g., In re Samoni, 192 B.R. 877 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996). Courts have gener-
ally taken one of three approaches in determining dischargeability of credit card debt: the
"implied representation" theory, the "assumption of the risk" theory, and the "totality of
the circumstances" theory. See generally Citibank v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082.
108. 202 B.R. 74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
109. See Field, 116 S. Ct. 437. For a discussion of Fields, see supra note 2 and accompa-
nying text.
110. 202 B.R. at 78 (quoting Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Boydston (In re Boydston), 520
F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975)).
111. 202 B.R. at 79 (quoting In re Samani, 192 B.R. 877, 879-80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1996)).
112. Id.; see also In re Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1087-88 for a listing of twelve factors reviewed
in the Ninth Circuit.
1006 [Vol. 50
1997] BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 1007
In McDaniel, the court, obviously offended by what it perceived to be
overreaching on the part of the creditor, concluded that the creditor
could not now complain that the debtor committed fraud by doing the
very thing the creditor induced it to do.113 The debtor obtained cash ad-
vances to pay other bills. Other bankruptcy courts have reached different
conclusions on similar facts;114 however, the court gave notice that when
the solicitation comes from the creditor unilaterally and is unsolicited by
the debtor, the creditor will have a tough row to hoe in having that debt
declared non-dischargeable. 115
8. Homesteads
a. Family Rural Homestead Applied to Widower
In In re McDaniel,116 the Fifth Circuit (somewhat reluctantly) allowed
an adult widower with grown children to claim a full "family" rural home-
stead of up to 200 acres.117 The Court noted that although the debtor was
a widower with no dependent children, he remained a "family" for the
purpose of Texas Homestead Law given that under Texas law, the surviv-
ing spouse has the same homestead rights as both spouses had prior to
the death of one."18
The McDaniel court also addressed the effect of a written disclaimer
signed by the debtor to induce a bank to make a loan. 119 The court re-
peated the long-standing rule that in Texas "a homestead claimant is not
estopped to assert his homestead rights in property on the basis of decla-
rations made to the contrary if ... the claimant was in actual use and
possession of the property. ' 120 In McDaniel, the debtor's execution of
113. 202 B.R. at 79. "To allow the bank to prevail in this situation would result in
converting dischargeable debts into non-dischargeable debts and would amount to this
court condoning commercial entrapment." Id.
114. For example, taking advances from one card to pay on another may constitute
"credit card kiting," which according to the Ninth Circuit, provides the fraudulent intent
element of nondischargeability. See In re Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1088-89. ("[Tlhe kiting
scheme enables a dishonest debtor to hide his fraudulent intentions and engage in a spend-
ing spree which results in increasing amounts of credit card debt."). The Ninth Circuit has
been a source of much of the development of credit card cases in chapter 7. Compare In re
Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1088-89 with In re Hashemi, 104 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1996) and In re
Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996). See also In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Panel decision).
115. 202 B.R. at 790.
116. Border v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel), 70 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 843.
Indeed, we must uphold and enforce the Texas homestead laws even though
in so doing we might unwittingly-or even knowingly but powerless to avoid
it-"assist a dishonest debtor in wrongfully defeating his creditor." This may
account for the oft repeated creditor's lament "debtors either die or move to
Texas."
Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 844.
119. Id. at 843-44.
120. Id. at 843; see also Kennard v. MBank Waco (In re Kennard), 970 F.2d 1455, 1458
(5th Cir. 1992); Truman v. Deason (In re Niland), 825 F.2d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 1987).
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the disclaimer did not fit within two established exceptions,121 so the
court was left with no choice but to conclude that the disclaimer was inef-
fective to preclude McDaniel from later asserting his homestead claim. 122
b. Temporary Abandonment
In In re Leonard,123 Judge Akard of the Northern District was pro-
vided with another opportunity to write on the homestead issue. In Leo-
nard, the debtors temporarily vacated their 4,500 square foot home in
Midland, Texas and moved to a smaller town to enroll their daughter in
school. They testified that they intended to return to their home when
their daughter was old enough for junior high school. The debtors rented
out their Midland house from 1993 through and including their 1996
bankruptcy filing. They continued to receive mail at their Midland home,
maintained a listing in the Midland telephone directory, had call-forward-
ing from their Midland home, continued to vote in Midland, and listed
their Midland house as their address on their drivers' licenses. When
they filed bankruptcy, however, they listed their temporary home as their
residence address.
The creditor asserted that the debtors were judicially estopped from
claiming their Midland house as their homestead because they had listed
their other temporary home as their residence in their bankruptcy filing.
As the court stated, however, "a residence and a homestead may be two
different properties." The court determined that the debtors had not
abandoned their homestead, notwithstanding the temporary renting of
the home.124 This is consistent with two earlier Texas cases that allowed
temporary abandonment of homesteads to enable families to educate
121. "When, at the time of the disclaimer, (1) the debtor owned two or more noncon-
tiguous pieces of property any of which-but not more than one-could constitute a home-
stead; or, (2) the property described in the disclaimer was not being used for homestead
purposes." 70 F.3d at 843. The Court did not address it, but there may also be other
exceptions, including (i) when an owner does not occupy the property or uses it in such a
manner as to render its homestead status dubious; (ii)when owners create a lien by way of
a disguised sale; or (iii) when an owner represents to an assignee of a note that a note is a
secured by a valid mechanic's lien for improvements. See, e.g., Niland, 825 F.2d at 809;
Lincoln v. Bennett, 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. 1941).
122. 70 F.3d at 843-44.
123. 194 B.R. 807 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. 1996).
124. Id. at 810. As Judge Akard stated:
Courts first look to see whether the property at issue has been the home-
stead .... Next, the Court must determine if they have abandoned that home-
stead, either with or without acquiring another homestead. The bank has the
burden of proof because "anyone asserting an abandonment has the burden
of proving it by competent evidence." (Citations omitted) Whether the
homestead has been abandoned is a question of intent .... Temporary rent-
ing of the homestead does not change its homestead character if the home-
stead claimant has not acquired another homestead ...... The ultimate
question to be resolved is as to whether the claimant intended to resume the
possession of the premises as homestead." (citations omitted).
Id. at 810 (citing El Paso v. Long, 209 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
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their children in other locations.125
9. Personal Property Exemptions-The Insurance Saga Continues
At least two bankruptcy courts continued the struggle with the insur-
ance exemptions found in the Texas Property Code and the Texas Insur-
ance Code. In Chapter 42 of the Texas Property Code, which contains
the general statutory scheme for exempting personal property, among the
items listed is the "present value of any life insurance policy to the extent
that a member of the family of the insured . . . is a beneficiary of the
policy."'1 26 This interest is listed among the categories of property that
are subject to the limitation of $60,000 for a family and $30,000 for an
individual.127
The Texas Insurance Code, however, provides a broad unlimited ex-
emption for a wide variety of insurance benefits including "all money or
benefits of any kind, including policy proceeds and cash values .... ,,128
This exemption is unlimited in value, and as mentioned, it applies not
only to cash values, but to virtually any money or benefit arising from
qualifying policies.129
This leaves a difficult issue on which there is yet no consensus:
Whether a debtor may claim the unlimited insurance exemption under
the Insurance Code and still enjoy the benefits of the $60,000/$30,000 per-
sonal property exemption under the Property Code. Prior to the survey
period, at least three bankruptcy courts had struggled with this issue with
differing results. 130 During the Survey period, two more bankruptcy
125. See Leonard, 194 B.R. at 811; see also Birdwell v. Burleson, 72 S.W. 446 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1902, writ ref'd); C. Aultman & Co. v. Allen, 33 S.W. 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ
ref'd).
126. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
127. Id. § 42.002(a)(1) and (2).
128. Article 21.22 of the Texas Insurance Code provides as follows:
Art. 21.22. Unlimited Exemption of Insurance Benefits and Annuity Pro-
ceeds From Seizure Under Process.
Sec. 1. Notwithstanding any provision of this Code other than this Article,
all money or benefits of any kind, including policy proceeds and cash values,
to be paid or rendered to the insured or any beneficiary under any policy of
insurance ... issued by a life, health or accident insurance company, includ-
ing mutual and fraternal insurance, or under any plan or program of annui-
ties and benefits in use by any employer, shall:
(a) inure exclusively to the benefit of the person for whose use and benefit
the insurance is designated in the policy or contract;
(b) be fully exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment or other
process;
(c) be fully exempt from being seized, taken or appropriated or applied by
any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability
of the insured or of any beneficiary, either before or after said money or
benefits is or are paid or rendered; and,
(d) be fully exempt from all demands in any bankruptcy proceeding of the
insured or beneficiary.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon's Supp. 1996).
129. Id.
130. See In re Young, 166 B.R. 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994); In re Shurley, 163 B.R. 286
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Bowes, 160 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
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courts also attempted to reconcile the statutes, again with diametrically
differing results.
Judge Leif Clark first addressed the issue in In re Borchers.131 Judge
Clark found the two statutes to be at odds with each other-recognizing,
however, that the court should nevertheless construe statutes in a way to
give each of them meaning and effect if possible.132 The court analyzed
and disagreed with In re Bowes,133 in which Judge Akard had earlier al-
lowed Chapter 7 debtors to exempt their full $77,000.00 cash surrender
value, exhausting their $60,000.00 Texas Property Code cap in the pro-
cess. In Borchers, Judge Clark disagreed based both on statutory con-
struction and legislative history. 34 Reasoning that the 1991 amendments
to the Texas Insurance Code were a legislative reaction to another bank-
ruptcy case,135 it was apparent to him that the legislature expressly in-
tended to overrule that case, the net effect of which was "to enable
debtors... to completely exempt the cash value of life insurance policies
without regard to the monetary cap set out in section 42.001 of the Texas
Property Code."' 36 Accordingly, the Borchers court allowed the debtors
to take full advantage of both exemption schemes without regard to the
Property Code caps.137
Shortly thereafter, Judge Felsenthal of the Northern District was faced
with a similar issue in the context of an annuity contract and cash surren-
der values. In In re Scott,1 38 Judge Felsenthal, also relying in part on stat-
utory construction principles, disagreed with Borchers and instead
followed the approach taken by the Bowes court.139 Judge Felsenthal
found that the legislature intended to maintain present value of life insur-
ance policies within the Property Code. 140
As of this writing, the number of bankruptcy courts that have wrestled
with this issue is now up to five, each with somewhat different results. 14'
Given the various tools of statutory construction of which the courts have
availed themselves, it may simply be that there is no right answer to this
issue. This author joins in Judge Clark's appeal that the Legislature take
131. 192 B.R. 698 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
132. Id. at 701.
133. 160 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
134. Borchers, 192 B.R. 701-05.
135. See In re Brothers, 94 B.R. 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (previously held that cash
surrender values were limited by Texas Property Code cap because they were excluded
from any mention in the Insurance Code).
136. Borchers, 192 BR. at 705.
137. Id.
138. 193 B.R. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
139. Id. at 809.
140. Id. at 810-11. Judge Felsenthal found that because both amendments were enacted
virtually simultaneously, and because the legislature did not manifest an intent for the
general to prevail over the specific, the special limitation of $60,000 must apply over the
general unlimited provision of the Insurance Code. Id. at 811.
141. Bowes could have resolved the issue; however, after the case had been on appeal
in the district court for over two years, the parties settled. 160 B.R. at 290.
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the steps necessary to fix this problem.142
10. Personal Property Exemptions- Tools of the Trade
At least two bankruptcy courts addressed the issues of tools of the
trade, although in somewhat different contexts. Judge Akard applied
what has become known as the "use test" to determine whether an item is
a tool of the trade under the ever expanding definition of that term.143 In
this context, Judge Akard found that a variety of items of restaurant
equipment'" were all necessary to carry on the business of operating a
restaurant. The court distinguished prior Texas cases that had in effect
discriminated against restaurant operators in the "tool of the trade" anal-
ysis under earlier statutes and found that under the "more modern and
inclusive approach" the exemption should be allowed for such restaurant
equipment. 145
A subsequent opinion from Judge Greendyke of the Southern District
reminds us that there are limits to this expanding definition tools of the
trade. In In re Erwin,146 Judge Greendyke denied an exemption claim to
a county constable who used his Ford Crown Victoria to serve papers and
carry out other constable duties.147 Recognizing Judge Akard's prior rul-
ings in In re Nash148 and Baldowski,149 the court found that this expan-
sion is not unlimited, especially when the property in question has "only a
remote, or even a moderate nexus with [a debtor's] trade or profes-
sion.' 50 Recognizing that the debtor used his vehicle for personal and
family use, that any 4-door vehicle would suffice for the constable duties,
and that the debtor was not self-employed, the court concluded that the
debtor's use of the vehicle was too tenuous in relation to his employment
to justify avoidance of a non-purchase money non-possessory lien as a
tool of the trade.' 51
11. BFP Extended To Post-Petition Tax Sale
In the 1994 case of BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,152 the Supreme
142. "The legislature could save further litigation and uncertainty on the part of liti-
gants with a simple clarifying amendment to the Property Code." 192 B.R. at 705. Judge
Clark suggests two amendments that would lead to a result consistent with his ruling in
Borchers. See id.
143. In re Baldowski, 191 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996). "Tracing the evolution of
the Texas Exemption Statute, it is apparent that the legislature continually expanded the
statute to cover more property." Id. at 105.
144. Id. at 106 (for example, booths, a cash register, plates, platters, knives, forks,
spoons, tables, chairs, and glasses).
145. Id. at 106-07.
146. 199 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996).
147. Id at 630-31.
148. 142 B.R. 148 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (Tool of the trade exemption applies to large
farm items-plows, tractors, etc.)
149. 191 B.R. 102.
150. Erwin, 199 B.R. at 631.
151. Id.
152. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
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Court held that the price received at a regularly conducted non-collusive
foreclosure sale establishes "a fair and proper price, or a 'reasonably
equivalent value,' for foreclosed property" in the context of the reason-
ably equivalent value standard found in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
(which deals with pre-petition fraudulent conveyances). In In re T.F.
Stone Co.,15 3 the Fifth Circuit applied similar reasoning in upholding a
post-petition tax foreclosure sale. The debtor had sought to set aside the
sale under § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for avoidance
of certain post-petition transfers. 154
One exception to the avoidance powers found under § 549 protects
from avoidance "a transfer of real property to a good faith purchaser
without knowledge of the commencement of the case and for present fair
equivalent value.' 55 There is a subtle distinction, however, between this
statutory language and the "reasonably equivalent value" provision
found in § 548, which deals with pre-petition transfers. The T.F. Stone
court compared the two statutes and concluded that Congress did not
intend a meaningful difference between the term "reasonably" and the
phrase "present fair" as applied in the context of the forced sale at is-
sue.156 Moreover, the court also found that neither phrase was synony-
mous with "fair market value," which would have had a more profound
effect upon the public policy interest in insuring "security of the titles to
real estate" in the context of mortgage foreclosure sales and tax sales of
real property. 157
III. FEDERAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
During the Survey period, at least two cases arose in the federal courts
dealing with applicability of the federal statues of limitation in the con-
text of failed financial institutions.158 These cases dealt with both the
general federal statute of limitations 159 and the more specific statute deal-
153. T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper (In re T.F. Stone Co.), 72 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1995).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1993).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (1993).
156. 72 F.3d at 470-71.
157. Id. at 471.
In sum, we read BFP to say that, in the context of a forced sale, (1) § 549(c)'s
requirement of "present fair equivalent value" ought not be measured
against the property's "fair market value"; and (2) given the State's essential
interest in maintaining clear titles to real property, we should not attempt to
ascertain the substantive content of "present fair equivalent value."
Id. at 472. The court, acknowledging that Congress intended stricter limitations on post-
petition transfers than pre-petition transfers, did not mandate any difference in determin-
ing the "equivalent value" received by the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 470.
158. In addition to the two cases arising in Texas based courts, an Oklahoma appellate
court recently ruled that a purchaser of a note and mortgage that the FDIC acquired as
receiver of an insolvent mortgagee stepped into the shoes of the FDIC and had six years
from the date of the FDIC's appointment as a receiver to foreclose on a mortgage. See
SMS Fin. v. Ragland, 918 P.2d 400 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) ("[Elvery action for money damages brought by the United
States... founded upon any contract ... shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within
six (6) years after the right of action accrues.").
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ing with failed financial institutions enacted as part of FIRREA.160
The more significant of the two cases was Cadle Co. v. 1007 Joint Ven-
ture,'61 which addressed the two year state statute of limitations for re-
covery of deficiency judgments following real property foreclosures vis-d-
vis FIRREA's six year statute. 162 Courts have routinely allowed assign-
ees of the FDIC to enjoy the full benefits of the applicable federal statue,
both in a limitations context and otherwise; 63 however, the distinguish-
ing fact in Cadle Co. was that the loan in question was performing at the
time of the receivership and the note remained current the entire time
the FDIC had ownership of it. The Fifth Circuit held that an assignee of
the FDIC can invoke FIRREA's six year limitations period "only if the
note at issue was in default either before the FDIC acquire[d] it or while
the FDIC owned it."164 The court reasoned that FIRREA's six year limi-
tations period had no significance independent of a "claim" to which it
applies; rather it applies only to an accrued claim and not to a performing
note.1 65 As the Fifth Circuit's reasoning continued: "Until a note is in
default, there is no claim and hence no need to ask whether FIRREA's
federal limitations rule supplants an otherwise applicable state statue of
limitations." 66
In Cadle Co., the surviving bank foreclosed in October of 1991, and suit
was filed in September of 1994. With Cadle Co. left to rely only upon the
two year state statute, the trial court entered a summary judgment that
Cadle Co. take nothing, which the Fifth Circuit affirmed based upon the
foregoing reasoning. 67
As mentioned above, there are actually two federal statutes of limita-
tions that appear to apply to suits on notes. In the context of failed finan-
cial institutions, however, one unresolved issue has been whether and to
what extent the newer FIRREA statute completely supersedes the long-
standing general federal statute of limitations. In what was apparently a
case of first impression, a federal district court addressed this issue in
160. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A). This statute, enacted as part of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, provides that the six year limitation period
begins to run on the later of the date of the appointment of the FDIC as conservator or
receiver or the date on which the cause of action accrues. Id.
161. 82 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. 1996).
162. Section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code provides a two (2) year statute of limi-
tations for a deficiency following a foreclosure sale:
If the price at which real property is sold at a foreclosure sale under sec-
tion 51.002 is less than the unpaid balance of the indebtedness secured by the
real property, resulting in a deficiency, any action brought to recover the
deficiency must be brought within two (2) years of the foreclosure sale and is
governed by this section.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(a) (Vernon 1995) (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., Davidson v. FDIC, 44 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d
805 (5th Cir. 1993).
164. Cadle Co., 82 F.3d at 105.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 106. The court went on to discuss other public policy issues.
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Midstates Resources Corp. v. Farmer's Aerial Spraying Service,168 which
was originally filed more than six years after the original maturity date.169
Less than six years prior to suit, however, the borrowers, through counsel,
acknowledged the indebtedness in writing, which under § 2415 (the old
federal statute) is effective for renewing limitations. The FIRREA stat-
ute, however, contains no such acknowledgment of indebtedness provi-
sion. The borrowers asserted that FIRREA's limitation statute
completely superseded § 2415, giving the written acknowledgment of the
debt no effect.
The court addressed the issue as one of statutory construction-the ap-
plication of an existing broad statute (§ 2415) following the enactment of
a more recent narrow statute (FIRREA), each covering related subject
matter. The court found that the more specific FIRREA statute controls
only when one of its specific statutory rules conflicts with one of § 2415's
more general rules.170 The court therefore found that both statutes ap-
plied, and in the context of Midstates Resources, the acknowledgment of
indebtedness provision of the old federal statute governed. 171 Therefore,
under Midstates Resources, the general federal statute of limitations still
applies to notes payable to failed financial institutions subject only to
more specific provisions found in FIRREA. 172
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE COURTS
A. ARTICLE 9-DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
By way of example, three cases are worthy of note with respect to dis-
position of personal property collateral upon default. In the first of those
three cases, Havins v. First National Bank of Paducah,173 the Amarillo
court, in what it determined to be a deficiency action, addressed both the
commercially reasonable sale and notice of disposition provisions of sec-
tion 9.504 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 174
168. 914 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
169. Id. at 1426. One point of disclosure: this author's firm represented the Plaintiff in
this case. In Midstates Resources, all original limitations periods had apparently expired by
the time Midstates filed suit.
170. Id. at 1426 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir.
1994)).
171. 914 F. Supp. at 1427.
172. This is consistent with an earlier observation of the Texas Supreme Court in Jack-
son v. Thweat, 883 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex. 1994) (FIRREA "does not create an entirely new
limitations scheme, but rather clarifies and amends existing law under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(a)."). This survey was cited by the Midstates Resources court in anticipating this
issue. See Midstates Resources, 914 F. Supp. at 1426 n.3. (At least one commentator has
anticipated this issue. See Cox, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 18, at 908).
173. 919 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ)
174.
Section 9.504 grants creditors the right, after default by the debtor, to sell,
lease, or otherwise dispose of any collateral securing payment of the debt.
TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
Should they opt to dispose of it, they must take care to assure that "every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place, and
terms ... [is] commercially reasonable." Id. at 9.504(c).
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In Havins, the creditor repossessed some cattle, and within approxi-
mately six weeks thereafter the cattle were sold by the bank at auction in
a local sale barn. The Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in
favor of the lender after having addressed "no evidence" points regarding
the commercial reasonableness of the sale and whether and to what ex-
tent there was any notice provided thereof.175 As a practical matter, this
case really turned upon whether the collateral was "perishable, threaten-
ing to decline speedily in value, or of a type customarily sold on a recog-
nized market," in which event the creditor may have been excused from
providing the debtor with notice of the sale.' 76 The court found that
there was no evidence regarding the debtor having been provided with
prior notice of the sale, nor was the trial court provided with any evi-
dence to assist it in determining whether the cattle were of the type sold
on a recognized market. 177 Importantly, the court did not reject out of
hand the possibility that cattle are collateral that may be sold on a recog-
nized market at a cattle auction like that found in the instant case. To the
contrary, the court found that in the context of cattle auctions, the "rec-
ognized market" issue is a fact intensive determination that should be
determined by courts on a case to case basis.178 As mentioned, however,
the court reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment due to the
lack of evidence of notice and commercial reasonableness of the
disposition.179
In Acuff v. Lamesa National Bank,180 the lender had previously ac-
cepted certain collateral in partial satisfaction of a debt, also entering into
a written agreement regarding the debt and the application of credits
based upon the surrender of the collateral. The bank subsequently dis-
posed of the collateral and then sought to reduce the remaining indebted-
ness to a judgment. The court held that the surrender of the collateral in
partial and specific satisfaction of a portion of the debt was in essence a
sale from the debtor to the lender.' 8 ' Therefore, at the time of the ulti-
mate disposition of the collateral by the bank, the bank had already be-
come the owner of that property and "there was no sale or disposition by
the 'secured party' which would require notice under section 9.504.182
919 S.W.2d at 180-81.
175. Id. at 182-84.
176. "Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification [of a public or pri-
vate sale] shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor..." Id. at 182-83 (citing TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)).
177. The court provides an analysis of this "recognized market" issue. 919 S.W.2d at
183.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 184. The court listed numerous factors that should have been elicited at the
trial would have assisted the court in making a determination on the "recognized market"
issue. Id. The court also noted that the trial court's taking judicial notice that cattle are
normally sold through livestock auction commission merchants did "nothing to fill the
void." Id.
180. 919 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, no writ).




In Schmid v. Texas Commerce Bank,183 the court of appeals upheld a
summary judgment in favor of a lender who had retained some pledged
stock certificates in its possession while ultimately seeking a judgment
prior to disposition of that stock. 184 The court of appeals found that the
bank's choosing to retain that stock while at the same time attempting to
reduce its claim to judgment did not constitute an election of remedies.18 5
The court found that section 9.501(a) allows a secured party to reduce its
claim to judgment, foreclose, or enforce its security interest by any avail-
able judicial procedure.' 86 The court noted further that section 9.504
"does not require but rather allows a secured party to sell the
collateral."' 187
B. REAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURES
In Provident National Assurance Company v. Stevens, 88 the Texas
Supreme Court allowed a creditor who had foreclosed two notes secured
by two tracts of property upon one blanket bid to allocate the foreclosure
,proceeds after the fact as it saw fit. 189 The guarantor, in defense of a
deficiency suit filed by the lender claimed that the creditor's single bid for
the two separate properties effectively precluded it from ever being able
to prove deficiencies on either note or either property. The supreme
court, however, disagreed and allowed the creditor to pursue a deficiency
on this basis, even though the creditor's allocation occurred after the
sale. 190
In Bonilla v. Roberson,191 the court of appeals held that a holder of a
deed of trust who discovered after foreclosure that the debtor had appar-
ently committed substantial waste on the property could not in effect
change its mind and rebid the property at a subsequent sale.' 92 The court
held that the only remedy for the holder of the deed of trust would be to
bring a judicial action seeking to set aside the sale and canceling the
trustee's deed.' 93 The lender could not simply enter into a private ar-
rangement with the trustee to cancel the prior trustee's deed and re-no-
183. 912 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
184. Id. at 846.
185. Id. at 847.
186. Id. at 846.
187. Id. (emphasis added). The borrower had also filed a counterclaim alleging conver-
sion; however, the trial court entered summary judgment that the debtor take nothing on
that claim. That was also upheld on appeal. The court factually distinguished other cases
that dealt with an unreasonable delay in disposing of collateral under different facts. In
Schmid, the collateral was held by the bank for over three years before seeking summary
judgment. The court did not address whether and to what extent such collateral retention
would ultimately lead to a strict foreclosure or otherwise limit the creditor's remedies. Id.
at 846-47.
188. 910 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995).
189. Id. at 229.
190. Id.
191. 918 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
192. Id. at 22.
193. Id. at 21-22.
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tice a sale that had already been conducted and closed.194
In In re Gayle,195 a Texas based bankruptcy court found that a creditor
holding a claim secured by a deed of trust could seek to reduce the claim
to judgment prior to seeking foreclosure of its deed of trust lien.196 The
court determined that this was not an election of remedies as is the case
when deciding between judicial foreclosure and non-judicial
foreclosure. 97
The court found that the situation regarding reducing a debt to judg-
ment prior to foreclosure was somewhat analogous to the previously well
settled situation regarding debts secured by personal property. 198 The
court found that because the note and the lien are separate and severable
rights held by a creditor, and further finding that doctrine of merger did
not effect the lien, the court ruled that the creditor could reduce the debt
to judgment and thereafter seek a non-judicial foreclosure. 199 The court
acknowledged, however, that if a judicial foreclosure had been sought in
the prior case and not granted, that could have been a bar to future fore-
closure relief. 200
C. GUARANTOR NOTICE AND LIABILITY
In Bishop v. National Loan Investors,20 the court addressed two issues:
whether a creditor was required to sue the maker of a note prior to suing
the guarantor and whether the guarantor was entitled to notice of a fore-
closure sale on deed of trust property securing the guaranteed debt. The
court found that the guaranty in question was unconditional in nature,
restating the long standing rule as follows: "The unconditional guarantor
194. Id. at 21-23.
195. 189 B.R. 914 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995).
196. Id. 916-19.
197. Id. at 916.
198.
The law pertaining to the right to nonjudicially foreclose on personal prop-
erty after a judgment on a promissory note has been rendered is well settled.
After a debtor defaults on a secured personal property note, the creditor
may exercise any right provided in the security agreement (with restrictions),
reduce its claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the security in-
terest by any available judicial procedure. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.501(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). These rights and remedies are
cumulative.
Id. at 916. Moreover, the judgment would be secured by the same property, relating back
to the inception of the original security interest. See TEX. Bus. & CaM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.501(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) which provides:
When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment, the lien of any levy
which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of any execution based
upon the judgment shall relate back to the date of the perfection of the se-
curity interest in such collateral. A judicial sale, pursuant to such execution,
is a foreclosure of the security interest by judicial procedure within the mean-
ing of this section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and there-
after hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this Chapter.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
199. In re Gayle, 189 B.R. at 921.
200. Id.
201. 915 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
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of a note is primarily liable, and waives any requirement that the holder
of the note take action against the maker as a condition precedent to the
guarantor's liability unless the guaranty specifically states otherwise." 20 2
The court determined that the guaranty in questions was such an un-
conditional guaranty.203 The court further found that the guarantor was
not entitled to notice of a deed of trust foreclosure sale affecting real
property. 20 4 The court noted the distinction between that rule regarding
real property and a requirement to the contrary in article 9 of the UCC as
to personal property.20 5
In In re El Paso Refining,206 a bankruptcy court dealt with a guaranty
agreement that specifically authorized the creditor to release any obligor
without impairing that creditor's ability to seek payment from a guaran-
tor. Noting that "[a] guaranty of payment creates direct and primary lia-
bility for the guarantor[,] 207 there is likewise no requirement that a
creditor take action against the primary obligor as a condition precedent
to the guarantor's liability. Therefore, in the situation facing that court,
the release of the primary obligor in and of itself "had no effect on [the
guarantor's] liability for the Guaranteed Obligations." 20 8
D. TAX LIEN SUBROGATION
In Benchmark Bank v. Crowder,209 the Texas Supreme Court found
that a third party lender may be subrogated to a federal tax lien and thus
entitled to enforce the tax lien against the taxpayers' homestead. In
Crowder, the borrowers obtained a loan from Benchmark Bank's prede-
cessor, the proceeds of which were used to discharge a federal tax lien
against the borrowers' homestead. The borrowers asserted that the lien
was invalid because it impaired their homestead rights; however, the
supreme court recognized that under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, the federal government may obtain a valid, enforcea-
ble tax lien against a Texas homestead. 210 The court further found that
when such a tax lien is refinanced, the new lender is subrogated to the tax
lien much in the same way that a third party who refinances a debt se-
202. Id. at 244 (citing Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1977)).
203. 915 S.W.2d at 244.
204. Id. at 245.
205. Id. ("There is a definite distinction between guarantors of a loan secured by realty
under the Property Code and a loan secured by consumer goods under the Business and
Commerce Code.").
206. 192 B.R. 144 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
207. Id. at 148.
208. Id. at 148. The court relied on a Seventh Circuit case that reiterated that such a
guarantee may stay in full force and effect until all indebtedness from the underlying obli-
gation is paid in full, regardless of any settlement, compromise, release, or modification
involving the primary obligor. Id. at 149 (quoting Central Soya Co. v. Epstein Fisheries,
676 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1982)).
209. 919 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1996).
210. Id. at 660.
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cured by a valid mechanic's lien is also subrogated. 211 The court reiter-
ated that once valid, a lien does not become invalid simply because it is
refinanced. Moreover, the court further found that not only could the
subrogated lien be refinanced, but that a future deed of trust renewing
and extending the old lien may also provide for new terms, including the
power of sale authorizing a non-judicial foreclosure.212 The court, how-
ever, found that because there was no federal tax lien against Crowder,
she was entitled to compensation for her interest in the homestead that
was foreclosed. 213
It should be noted that an amendment to the Texas Constitution has
been approved pursuant to which a homestead may be encumbered for
the refinancing of a lien, including a federal tax lien.214 That amendment,
however, had no bearing in Crowder because the tax lien and subrogation
rights were fixed before the amendment's adoption.215 Therefore,
although this issue has, to some extent, been addressed constitutionally,
Crowder remains instructive as to situations that predate the amendments
and also with respect to foreclosure rights and the enforceability of other
terms subsequently agreed to by the borrower and the lender.
On the other hand, a creditor attempting to equitably subrogate itself
to the position of an ad valorem taxing entity may be in a different situa-
tion. In Jackson v. Stonebriar Partnership,216 the Dallas Court of Appeals
found that a creditor could not subrogate itself to the position of an ad
valorem taxing entity in an effort to recover ad valorem taxes it paid on a
tract of property after foreclosure. 217 This opinion does not necessarily
reflect a change in Texas law; however, it should be read and analyzed in
an effort to gain an understanding of how to deal with ad valorem taxes
with respect to real property that is in the process of being foreclosed.
E. LENDER LIABILITY
There were no significant developments regarding lender liability.
There were a number of interesting cases, however, that addressed situa-
tions where debtors sought to impose liability based on wrongful foreclo-
sure or other collection action or otherwise as a result of a breach of an
alleged agreement. For example, in Bluebonnet Savings Bank, F.S.B. v.
Grayridge Apartment Homes, Inc.,218 the Houston Court of Appeals
found that statements to the effect that a loan restructuring proposal
"looked fine" and that "everything would be okay" did not rise to the
211. Id. at 661 ("We see no difference between the refinancing of debts secured by a
mechanic's lien and the refinancing of debt secured by a federal tax lien.") (citing Farm &
Home Savings Ass'n v. Martin, 88 S.W.2d 459, 469-70 (Tex. 1935)).
212. Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 662.
213. Id. at 659, 662.
214. Id. at 660 (citing TEX. CONST. art. xvi, § 50 (Vernon 1996)).
215. 919 S.W.2d at 660.
216. 931 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ requested).
217. Id. at 640.
218. 907 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
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level of negligent misrepresentation.2 19 The court further found that the
debtor did not "justifiably rely" on such representations.220 This case was
followed by the Fifth Circuit in Clardy Manufacturing Co. v. Marine Mid-
land Business Loans, Inc.,221 where the court found that a lender's state-
ment that a loan commitment would be issued "in a few days" did not
give rise to a promissory estoppel claim. 222
In Maginn v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc.,223 an unsuccessful mortgage loan
applicant sued a bank for breach of contract (both written and oral),
promissory estoppel, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA), negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and negligent misrepresen-
tation. With the exception of certain of the tort claims, the court of ap-
peals upheld a summary judgment against the unsuccessful applicant. 224
Most importantly, the court found that the loan applicants were not con-
sumers under the DTPA.225 Moreover, the court found that the bor-
rower's contract claim failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.226 The court
did, however, allow the tort claims to survive, remanding the case for
further proceedings. 227
V. CONSUMER CREDIT COLLECTIONS
A. STATE COURT-TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION Acr
In Waterfield Mortgage Co. v. Rodriguez,228 the San Antonio court up-
held a trial court finding that a mortgage company violated the Texas
Debt Collection Act and, further upheld an award of exemplary damages
to the debtors.229 According to the court of appeals, the borrowers had
repeatedly attempted to bring the payments current, but those attempts
were refused. Moreover, after refusing such attempts, the creditor con-
tinued to add late charges to the debt. The court of appeals recognized
that the creditor telephoned the borrowers' bank and were told that one
of the checks tendered for late payments would not clear because of in-
sufficient funds; however, the debtors apparently made a subsequent
tender by cashier's check of the full amount due. The lender rejected that
cashier's check and raised the demand by an additional sum because of
posting and reinstatement fees. The debtor testified he would have paid
219. Id. at 909-10.
220. Id. at 911-12.
221. 88 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 1996).
222. Id. at 351. The court also found that the borrower was not a consumer under the
DTPA.
223. 919 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
224. Id. at 166-69.
225. Id. at 167.
226. The court also addressed claims arising out of or pertaining to section 26.02(e) of
the Texas Business and Commerce Code regarding "merger" clauses in loan agreements.
Id. at 167-68.
227. Id. at 168-69.
228. 929 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
229. A DTPA claim was dismissed, so there was no ruling on the borrowers' standing
as "consumers" under the DTPA. One can only assume that under established cases law
they would not have been considered consumers under that act.
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that amount but was never given the chance because the foreclosure oc-
curred before receiving that notification.
The court found that "the haste in pushing through foreclosure, then
forcible entry and detainer, and selling the family home while the owner
is offering the money that would essentially bring him current, is ample
evidence to support [a finding of] actual damages and violation of the
Texas Debt Collection Statute. '230 The court further allowed the imposi-
tion of punitive damages, noting that although legislative amendments
codified much of the law relating to exemplary damages, the Texas Debt
Collection Statute was specifically excluded. 231 The court of appeals up-
held the punitive damage award even though there were no showings of
personal abuse, phone calls, or other intimidating factors typically found
in situations of that nature.232 The court simply found that "taking some-
one's home away from them when they are making good faith attempts to
pay ever-escalating demands is worse than insulting or threatening them.
Better harassed than homeless. '233 The court further disregarded the
bona fide error defense, finding that there was no pleading or evidence to
support such a defense in the trial court.234 Although one might argue
that the court may have gone a bit too far,235 especially in imposing ex-
emplary damages, this case should be required reading for every con-
sumer lender and counsel.
B. FEDERAL COURT-FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICEs Acr
While the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)236 still proves
somewhat of a mine field for the unwary practitioner in other jurisdic-
tions,237 the Fifth Circuit took a step toward placing some reasonable pa-
rameters on the FDCPA in the context of violations where no actual
damages result. In Johnson v. Eaton,238 a lawyer representing a furniture
company attempting to collect a past due debt, along with his legal assis-
tant, were sued based upon a demand letter and a second letter, which
included a questionnaire and proposed consent judgment. The debtor
stipulated before trial that she had suffered no actual damages as a result
230. Id. at 645.
231. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b)(6) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
232. 929 S.W.2d at 649 (Duncan, J., concurring and dissenting).
233. Id. at 647.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 647 (Duncan, J., concurring and dissenting) (dissent disagrees with impo-
sition of punitive damages).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
237. See, e.g., Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996) (mass produced letters bearing
lawyer's facsimile signature misleading because not actually from lawyer; contradictions in
notice rendered notice improper); Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D.
Fla. 1996) (lawyer's attempt to collect unauthorized payoff fee violated act); see also
Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1996). Cf Dick-
erman v. National Educators, Inc., 81 F.3d 949 (10th Cir. 1996) (initial contact with debtors
lawyer).
238. 80 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 1996).
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of the initial demand letter, and the jury subsequently found that the law-
yer's conduct was likewise not a cause of any actual damage to the
debtor. The trial court, however, awarded the debtor $500 in "additional
damages" against the lawyer, and in excess of $10,000 in attorney's fees
against both defendants.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the award of attorney's fees against the legal
assistant, stating that the express language of the FDCPA expressly con-
ditions an award of attorney's fees, "which are available only where the
Plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that the defendant is liable for ac-
tual and/or additional damages. '2 39 The court reasoned further that to
allow an attorney's fee recovery where the plaintiff has failed to prove
damages, "rewards lawyers for bringing suits to stop behavior that, by
definition, has caused legal injury to no one. '240
As to the lawyer against whom five hundred dollars in "additional
damages" was awarded, the court remanded for reconsideration of the
issue of attorney's fees with instructions that the court reduce the award
of fees against Eaton to the extent that the fees originally awarded were
attributable to the preparation of the case against the legal assistant. Ob-
viously, the implication here is that the court allowed the recovery of at-
torney's fees from the lawyer because of the award of "additional"
damages.
Unfortunately, this determination still left what would appear to be a
somewhat nonsensical result-the award of attorney's fees based on an
award of additional damages when there were no actual damages in-
curred. This was unresolved by the Fifth Circuit because of a procedural
point regarding the submission of the jury charge. 241 This is pure specula-
tion, but one would think that the same logical reasoning that the court
applied in refusing to allow the award of attorney's fees against the legal
assistant would likewise apply to the inconsistency of allowing an award
of "additional" damages in the absence of actual damages. Again, how-
ever, this issue appears to be unresolved.
On the subject of the FDCPA, a case from another circuit is worthy of
note. In Avila v. Rubin,242 the Seventh Circuit found that mass produced
collection letters issued under a facsimile signature on a law firm's letter-
head were misleading because they gave the appearance of having been
written by a lawyer when in fact they were not.243 Although the Fifth
Circuit had not addressed this specific situation as of the Survey period,
this case appears to indicate that if a letter is coming from a lawyer seek-
239. Id. at 151. The court did not address whether the award of additional damages is
appropriate in the absence of a finding of actual damages because neither party preserved
the issue for appeal by objecting to the jury charge. Id. at 150.
240. Id. at 151. "Our interpretation of the statute will require attorneys to look for
more than a technical violation of the FDCPA before bringing suit and will deter suits
brought only as a means of generating attorney's fees." Id.
241. Id. at 150.
242. 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996).
243. Id. at 228-29.
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ing to recover a consumer debt, the lawyer should be careful about sign-
ing collection letters (or allowing use of a facsimile signature) unless the
lawyer has had some involvement in reviewing the file and actually gener-
ating or having some input into the content of the letter.
Additionally, the Avila court also took issue with the terms of the no-
tice used by that lawyer.244 In addition to attempting to comply with the
thirty day notice requirement, the notice also included a reference that to
the extent the FDCPA notice did not apply, then all actions required of
the debtor were to be undertaken within ten days. The Seventh Circuit
found this confusing and misleading to an unsophisticated consumer.245
In effect, the court found the inconsistent messages in the notice to be too
confusing and potentially misleading. 246
The bottom line with respect to the FDCPA is that it is still alive and
well, and in most situations, it still applies to lawyers. One or more bills
have been offered in Congress in an effort to narrow the scope of the
FDCPA to truly intentional and misleading action by debt collectors.
Unfortunately, however, in addition to providing the consumer protec-
tion for which it originally intended, the FDCPA still serves as a danger-
ous trap for the unwary practitioner.
244. Id. at 226.
245. The court also analyzed the effect of its use of the unsophisticated consumer as
opposed to the least sophisticated consumer test used by other courts. Id.
246. Id. at 227.
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